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DISCLOSURE OF INSIDE INFORMATION -
MATERIALITY AND TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
By JEREMY L. WIESEN*
INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 1966, the following item appeared in the
Philadelphia Inquirer:
Chairman Manuel Cohen of the Securities and Exchange
Commission said he's dissatisfied with the policy of many com-
panies to disclose privately to security analysts and big investors
significant information about a company's activities before its
release generally to the investing public.
"We have recently received indications, which are very dis-
turbing to me, that premature disclosure of corporate information
to limited groups of people who are in a position to act on it may
be more prevalent than we had supposed," Cohen said.
Without proposing possible solutions, Cohen further noted
''some evidence" that corporate disclosure requirements of the
Federal Securities laws aren't as effective as they should be.
Cohen expressed general agreement with the view that these
requirements "as now being applied, are not producing the quality
or amount of information that is essential for informed trading
in the secondary markets."
Cohen noted that institutional investors and brokerage ana-
lysts, recognizing the "deficiency" of current corporate disclosure
requirements, seek information about companies they're interested
in through personal talks with company officials.
Cohen said that if these big investors and analysts "are able
to obtain from the issuer because of their economic power, or for
other reasons, information that is not available to those with whom
they are trading in the public market, it raises serious questions of
law and propriety."'
* B.S., 1963, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Penn-
sylvania; LL.B., 1966, Harvard Law School; Assistant Professor of Business Law,
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 17, 1966, at 24, col. 8.
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The news report is particularly interesting for several reasons. In
the first place, research into the field leaves the unavoidable impression
that there is still little public verbalization by any source, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, of the great prevalence of private
disclosures of inside information. Anyone familiar with the Wall Street
community is aware that Chairman Cohen is attacking only the visible
portion of a very large iceberg.
Secondly, with the institution of suit against the Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Corporation,2 it was generally thought that sufficient progress of
a remedial nature was being made in this unspoken-of area. Until the
case was concluded, it appeared premature to say that the "Federal
Securities laws aren't as effective as they should be" or to suggest that
there may be a need for "solutions." The decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was filed on August 13, 1968. Its
effect on private flows of inside information will be analyzed in this
article. Materiality appears to have become the crux of enforcement,
and, therefore, this elusive concept must be better understood, or an
attempt must be made to find solutions which avoid an exact delineation
of its meaning.8
Another interesting point about the article is its failure to dis-
tinguish the separate problems raised by disclosure of information.
This presentation in the Inquirer, perhaps unintentionally, combined
several distinct problems. The second section of the article discusses
abuses of inside information by way of private disclosures, the third
section makes a general complaint about the securities laws as they
apply to disclosures, and the fourth section decries the insufficient
public dissemination of information. Of course each of these concerns
are interrelated, but analysis and understanding of the area requires a
separate examination of each of these problems rather than a combined
treatment. If materiality is to be the heart of this area, then we must
have clear standards by which to determine, for each purpose, the
meaning of "material," especially since that determination inherently
involves borderline cases.
Finally, the inclusion of institutional investors, along with security
analysts, as those who are privy to inside information is significant.
Only recently has the conduct of such large traders become of sufficient
concern that Congress has called for an immediate study of their total
impact on speculative markets.4  Part of that study, no doubt, will
2. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, CCH
F&D. Sitc. L. Rep. 92,251, at 97,169 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).
3. In a recent interview with Chairman Cohen, the New York Times reported:
Mr. Cohen asserted that officers of corporations should find few occasions
in which it is difficult to decide whether to make certain information available
or to whom it should be given.
When the company is dealing with what Mr. Cohen called a "financial
middleman" - chiefly public relations men or security analysts - it must decide,
he said, whether the information sought could be used for personal advantage.
"One of the key factors is the 'materiality' of the information sought," Mr.
Cohen declared. "It is my personal view that there is little room for doubt in
most cases and, where there may be legitimate doubt, it should be resolved in
favor of the investing public."
"Insiders Urged to Preserve Public's Trust," N.Y. Times, May 22, 1968, at 61, col. 4.
4. "2 in House Urge S.E.C. Study of Funds' Impact on Trading," N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1967, at 67, col. 6. On July 16, 1968, there was final Congressional approval of
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involve an examination of the existence or absence of abuses of inside
information. Even if that point is not central to the study, information
on the market activity of institutions will be provided which is not
now available and which may be suggestive of the existence of private
lines of communication. Data is lacking throughout this whole area,
and it is hoped that current efforts to interest economists and statis-
ticians in investigation of this phase of market activity will be succes-
ful.5 In the interim, recognizing the lack of specific data, the reader will
have to accept the general statements which follow as a sufficient basis
for a condemnation of practices in this area.
I. THE PREVALENCE OF "Tips" OF "INSIDE" INFORMATION
A. In General
Virtually every person who has had contact with the stock market
can attest to the phenomenon of tips of inside information, although
there is little documentation of this fact. Excerpts from two Wall Street
Journal articles state: ". . . it's generally conceded - and demonstrated
almost daily - that major corporate doings have a way of leaking out,
with or without a formal announcement [by the company]"' and, "It's
no secret in broker circles that much of the stock trading carried on
at exchanges and in the over-the-counter market as well is based on
supposedly inside information. ' 7
Except for the role of two "institutions" discussed below, i.e.,
the financial public relations firm and the security analyst meeting, it
is difficult to detail the various processes by which inside information
leaks out. The usual manner is through contacts with corporate man-
agement, but even this can take many forms. For example, it is reported
that the brokerage firm of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith
receives advance news releases from companies in order that they may
be prepared by that firm for dissemination over the teleprinter system
which connects its many offices. It is conceded by the firm that there
is nothing to stop a registered representative from seeing these advance
releases."
If a direct contact cannot be established there is always the possi-
bility of obtaining information through other persons who are in
privity with management. A public relations man informed the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's Special Study of the Securities Mar-
S.J. Res. 160 and on July 29, 1968, the President signed Pub. L. No. 90-438. The Wall
Street Journal reported on July 17, 1968, at 12, col. 2:
The proposed SEC study of institutional investment would involve a detailed
examination of the trading practice of banks, insurance companies, pension and
welfare funds, and other organizations. The SEC said the study's purpose would
be to collect information that might form the basis for later regulatory or
legislative action.
5. The salient example of such efforts was a symposium conducted in Wash-
ington, D.C., on March 7 and 8 entitled "Economic Policy and the Regulation of
Corporate Securities" sponsored by the National Law Center of George Washington
University and The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
6. "Conflict of Protection," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1965 at 14, col. 4.
7. "Policing Stock Tips," Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1965, at 1, col. 6.
8. Id. at 12, col. 3.
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kets: "There are.., men in each [brokerage] company who are the hot
tip boys; they are the aggressive boys. You know who they are; any-
body in the business does. If you don't, why, you find out."9
Some corporate information flows to individuals in a non-clandes-
tine manner; it is, in fact, deemed in the investing public's interest that
these individuals receive this information. The best example of this is
the "reasonable basis" rule, which has been applied by the Commission
and the courts to situations in which securities of little-known com-
panies have been sold by aggressive selling techniques. Those salesmen
have been held to have violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities statutes by not having a reasonable basis for representations
about the security.1" The salesman is said to be under a duty to visit
the company and discuss with management the affairs of the company."
This duty only arises when adequate information as to the company's
affairs is not publicly available. This situation sharply focuses the
delicate balance which exists between the need of all investors for ac-
curate financial data and the harmful effects of a private flow of this
information.
B. The Role of the Financial Public Relations Firm
The financial public relations firm is a species of the public relations
industry concerned with creating investor interest in their client's stock.
This is achieved, in part, by establishing contacts between the corpora-
tion's management and the financial community: "Personal contacts,
both with the financial press and the investment community, are the
very essence of financial public relations. In their selling literature,
financial public relations firms emphasize the closeness of their con-
tacts with financial writers and analysts."'" The Special Study made
a thorough investigation of the financial public relations industry be-
cause of its inherent tendency to distribute overly optimistic reports
about its clients. This tendency apparently stems from the propensity
of management to disseminate exaggerated claims about its company to
potential investors through its contacts with public relations firms.
It seems, however, that the real abuse uncovered by the Special
Study is the disclosure of inside information to a limited number of
persons."3 It is naive to think that security analysts can be easily duped
into believing untrue statements about a company. Like the boy who
cried "wolf" too many times, corporations and public relations firms
9. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, PPORT OV SPECIAL STUDY OF
SECURITIES MARKETS OP THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMIssIoN, H.R. Doc.
No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1963-64) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
10. Best Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960) ; Barnett & Co., 40 S.E.C. 1
(1960); N. Pinsker & Co., 40 S.E.C. 285 (1960); Berko v. S.E.C., 297 F.2d 116
(1961) ; cf. Note, New and Comprehensive Duties of Securities Sellers to Investigate,
Disclose, and Have an "Adequate Basis" for Representations, 62 MICH. L. REv. 880
(1964).
11. See MUNDHEIM, CONFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 76-77 (1964).
12. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 81.
13. Milton Cohen, Chairman of the Special Study, told this writer that the in-
vestigation into the public relations industry was prompted by the bullish market of
1961, and, therefore, it was predominantly concerned with the industry's role in dis-
seminating exaggerated claims about its clients.
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cannot create reliance on exaggerated claims over an extended period.
Except to the extent that false information is valuable as the basis of
a stock "push,"' 4 analysts and others are searching for information
which has merit and which has not been already discounted by the
market. The financial public relations firm has a role in that search.
The research partner at Sutro Bros. & Co., a brokerage firm, told the
Special Study: "The only time . . . a public relations firm can be
helpful is when I want to get on the phone or establish a contact with
a company personally."'l5
C. The Role of the Security Analyst Meeting
The security analyst meeting is a gathering at which a high-
ranking corporate manager delivers a speech about his company to a
group of security analysts. It often includes a question-and-answer
period. In 1965 there were approximately 5,500 such meetings.'"
They are usually sponsored by an association or society of analysts 7
but may be arranged for by a financial public relations firm for its
client.18
It would seem that security analysts would not go to the trouble
of attending meetings if all they were to hear was a reiteration of infor-
mation about the company already in the public sphere, information of
which, presumably, they are already aware. During early 1965 many
analysts began to complain that they found the meetings boring and
some even reported they had fallen asleep at the luncheon table. Their
protest was to the effect that "too few companies . . . are providing
the beneath-the-surface information they need to make investment
recommendations... ."'I Their cry was heard and acted upon. Some
corporate managers elicited help from research agencies in order to
discover what the analysts wanted to hear at the meetings. One poll
of analysts revealed that 90% wanted more data on products, 94%
on research and development, and 98% said that they desired more in-
formation on markets and sales projections. 20 After going to this
trouble and expense, there is no reason to think that speakers do not
heed the results of the surveys.
In case the officer or director does not have a copy of a research
agency's findings in front of him when he is preparing his address,
the analyst groups have provided him with suggestions. The Invest-
ment Analysts Society of Chicago sends prospective speakers a pamphlet
which advises them ". . . -to skip the recent history of the company...
and stress instead such things as new products, capital spending pro-
14. Knowledge of a "push" should be considered knowledge of inside information.
See page 222 infra.
15. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 87.
16. "Security Analysts Try to Improve Sessions With Company Brass," Wall
Street Journal, April 5, 1965, at 1, col. 4.
17. These analyst groups may be large, such as the 2800-member New York
Society of Security Analysts, or small, such as the societies which are limited to
analysts who are only concerned with one industry.
18. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 83-85. This is, then, another function of the
public relations firm.




jections and production rates."2 The New York Society of Security
Analysts has a similar procedure, but in case its advice is not followed
the question-and-answer period is relied upon to evoke the important
information. Toward this end, the society arranges for analysts
specializing in the industry under discussion to sit at the head table.
The news services are present at some analyst meetings. To the
extent that they simultaneously report to the public all of the speaker's
statements there is no danger of inside information being disclosed to
a limited number of persons. As reported above, there were approxi-
mately 5,500 analyst meetings in 1965, and at many of these, especially
the meetings held by small analyst groups, there was no press coverage.
This can result when the news media are invited but do not choose
to attend, when they are not invited, or when they are actually pro-
hibited from attending. Meetings of analysts in Boston usually pro-
hibit the presence of news reporters. 2 The effect of all this is evidenced
in the following observation: "Some [business] concerns charge that
some brokerage houses try to hoard the information their analysts get
[at meetings], rather than give it the wide distribution many companies
believe it should get."28
II. THE PROBLEM: ITS FRAMEWORK
It is useful to classify the abuse of inside information in the follow-
ing way:
1. Transactions by "true" insiders;
2. Transactions by persons who are first-hand recipients of inside
information, but who are not "true" insiders;
3. Transactions by persons who are second-hand recipients of
inside information.
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act 24 denotes those persons who
might popularly be called "true" insiders: essentially officers, directors,
and major stockholders. These individuals must file a report each
month with the Securities and Exchange Commission stating the
securities owned in the "issuer" with which they are connected and
the changes in ownership that have taken place in that month. Under
subsection (b) of Section 16:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an ex-
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Wall Street Journal, supra note 16.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
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empted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt
previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security
sold for a period exceeding six months.2 5
This section is a rather frequently referred to example of a rule-of-
thumb solution to what otherwise would be a difficult enforcement prob-
lem if done on a case-by-case basis. The effect of the section is to create
an irrebuttable presumption that when short swing profits result to
"true" insiders, the transactions were made on the basis of inside
information. As will be emphasized later, the difficult problem that this
section avoids is the necessity of proving that the information was
"material"; such proof is required for recovery under the general
fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. Although abandon-
ment of the necessity of showing intent would appear to be a major
point of Section 16(b), intent to defraud has not been a stumbling block
in actions under the general anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act. 6
Section 16 has its limitations in that it does not completely cover
the field of abuses of inside information by true insiders. Long-swing
profits, i.e., profits on purchases and sales, or sales and purchases,
resulting from transactions more than six months apart, do not auto-
matically inure to the corporation. However, the general fraud pro-
visions of the Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
26. The district court in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case quoted the Supreme Court's
decision in S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963):
It would defeat the manifest purpose of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940
for us to hold, therefore, that Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin
any practice which operates "as a fraud or deceit," intended to require proof of
intent to injure and actual injury to clients. (375 U.S. at 192, 84 S. Ct at 283).
Congress intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to be construed like
other securities legislation "enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds," not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.
(375 U.S. at 195, 84 S. Ct at 284). (Emphasis supplied).
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court
then said: "Since there is a direct parallel between the language of Rule lOb-5(3)
and Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, both in wording and in
intent, the use of "fraud" in Rule lOb-5(3) cannot be interpreted in its narrow
common law sense." Id. at 278.
The circuit court further emphasized this point when it stated that cer-
tain defendants
• . . who ordered purchases before the news could be deemed disclosed, claim,
nevertheless, that they were justified in doing so because they honestly believed
that the news of the strike had become public at the time they placed their orders.
However, whether the case before us is treated solely as an SEC enforcement pro-
ceeding or as a private action, proof of a specific intent to defraud is unnecessary.
In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the common
law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interests of broader
protection for the investing public so that negligent insider conduct has be-
come unlawful.




in particular,27 are applicable. Recovery against true insiders for fraud
is easier than against others in possession of inside information, since
it is not necessary to show that they are insiders. 28 However, the argu-
ment has at times been put forward that liability of true insiders for
abuse of inside information can only be based upon Section 16(b),
or that officers and directors have, and should have, a right to purchase
stock in their corporation for long term holding under any circum-
stances. In dealing with the contention that Section 16(b) precludes
the application of the other fraud provisions to true insiders, the district
court -in Texas Gulf Sulphur said:
A Section 16 action can be brought only by the corporation itself
or derivatively by an existing security holder against officers,
directors or beneficial owners of ten percent or more of the cor-
poration's listed equity securities. It covers only short-swing
profits realized within a six-month period, and any recovery inures
to the corporation. Profits are recoverable regardless of any intent
to defraud and without proof that they were realized by reason of
inside information. In short, Section 16 was enacted as a "crude
rule of thumb" to make unprofitable all short-swing speculation by
a specifically defined group of insiders. See, Blau v. Lamb, 363
F. 2d 507 (2d Cir., 1966).
A Section 10(b) action, on the other hand, may be brought
pursuant to Section 27 by the Commission or by any party
claiming to have been defrauded. The section applies "to any
person," not merely to the persons encompassed by Section 16....
Section 16 requires both a purchase and a sale of a listed security,
while Section 10(b) applies to a purchase or sale of any security.
The numerous differences between Section 16 and Section 10(b)
clearly indicate that 'the provisions of the former impose no limita-
tion on the enforcement of the latter. 9
The argument that officers and directors should have unlimited
rights to purchase stock in their company has been of interest lately
because of a book in its defense by Professor Henry Manne.8" The
circuit court in Texas Gulf Sulphur expressly rejects this contention:
Our decision to expand the limited protection afforded outside
investors by the trial court's narrow definition of materiality is not
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967) :
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b. To make any untrue statements of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
28. Although Rule lOb-5 literally applies to "any person," it has been interpreted
to apply only to so-called "insiders." See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
29. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
30. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
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at all shaken by fears that the elimination of insider trading bene-
fits will deplete the ranks of capable corporate managers by taking
away an incentive to accept such employment. Such benefits, in
essence, are forms of secret corporate compensation, see Cary,
Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 408,
409-10 (1962), derived at the expense of the uninformed invest-
ing public and not at the expense of the corporation which receives
the sole benefit from insider incentives. Moreover, adequate incen-
tives for corporate officers may be provided by properly admin-
istered stock options and employee purchase plans of which there
are many in existence. In any event, the normal motivation in-
duced by stock ownership, i.e., the identification of an individual
with corporate progress, is ill-promoted by condoning the sort of
speculative insider activity which occurred here; for example,
some of the corporation's stock was sold at market in order to
purchase short-term calls upon that stock, calls which would never
be exercised to increase a stockholder equity in TGS unless the
market price of that stock rose sharply.31
The second category of abuse of inside information - transactions
by persons who are first hand recipients of inside information, but who
are not true insiders - seems to be at the heart of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur litigation. A typical case is the one present in Texas Gulf,
where a geologist, who was one of the first persons to realize the
extent of an ore discovery by the company for which he was working,
purchased shares of the company before the public disclosure of the find.
The analysis by District Judge Bonsal, in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case,
of whether the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
reach the geologist, and what must be proved for a finding of culp-
ability, is basically this:
1. In an action charging a violation of Rule lOb-5 it is not neces-
sary to establish all the elements of common law fraud, such as
misrepresentation or nondisclosure, materiality, scienter, intent
to deceive, reliance, and causation.32
2. It is especially unnecessary to prove an intent to deceive or
injure.33
3. All that must be shown to find a violation of Rule lob-5(3)
is that a purchase was made by an insider based upon material,
undisclosed information. 34
31. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FAD. Sic. L. RUP. f 92,251, at 97,180
(2d Cir. 1968). The district court commented that ". . . it is important under our free
enterprise system that insiders, including directors, officers, and employees, be en-
couraged to own securities of their company. The incentive that comes with stock
ownership benefits both the company and its stockholders." S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This statement, however, is used
only to make the point that the inside information must be material for Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to prohibit the purchase of shares.
32. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
33. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
34. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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4. As to what constitutes an insider, since Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 apply to "any person," all persons with undisclosed
and material information could be included; surely employees
who are in possession of such information obtained in the
course of their employment are insiders.35
5. It is no excuse that the purchase was made on a securities
exchange rather than in a face-to-face transaction so that it was
impossible to seek out the other party in order to disclose the
material information. The answer to such a dilemma is that the
insider must "forego the transaction. '86
This analysis rather assuredly places an employee, in possession of
material, undisclosed information, within the rubric of "insider." The
more difficult question, and the one of primary concern here, is raised
by the third category of abuse of inside information. The examples
of abuse noted in the Introduction to this article are of that kind:
transactions by persons who are second-hand recipients of "inside"
information, and particularly, information privately disclosed by cor-
porate managers. Since what is involved is a flow of information, there
are two roles involved. The "tipper" 37 of information, although not
directly profiting from a stock transaction, makes it possible for another
person, the "tippee," to benefit directly by transacting in shares on the
basis of the undisclosed information. Of course, the tippee can change
his role to that of a tipper by passing the information on to another
party who then takes advantage of it, thus creating a second link in the
private flow of information. The concern should probably only be
with the first communicative link; that from corporate manager to
his "tippee."' 8
Although all three categories of abuse produce the same result,
a "defrauded" stockholder, there seems to be a greater reluctance to
apply the fraud provisions of the securities acts to the tipper-tippee
situation. Generally, this is because neither party is at the same time
a recognized fiduciary of the corporation, or a person connected by way
of employment, and the person benefiting directly from the abuse.
There is also greater difficulty in uncovering this abuse. The corporate
manager must be shown both to have been privy to inside information,
which is also requisite in the first two categories, and to have abused
the information by way of private disclosure. This is not as easy to
detect or prove as an "untimely" transaction in the company's stock.
The overt act of purchasing is committed by the tippee, but he is at
most only tangentially connected with the corporation whose infor-
mation is being privately disclosed. 9 He has no part in the events
35. Id. at 278-79.
36. Id. at 279. See also note 62 infra and accompanying text.
37. Professor Loss appears to have coined the phrase "tippee," and common
parlance has followed the lead by referring to the conveyor of the information as the
"tipper." Loss' use of "tippee": 3 L. Loss, S4cuRITIzs RGULATION 1451 et seq.
(2d ed. 1961).
38. See pp. 217-20 infra.
39. Use of the word "purchasing" would appear to limit the discussion to bullish
news, but it is not intended to do so. Substantively the only difference between
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which have given rise to the inside information and is, of course,
anonymous to the Securities and Exchange Commission as far as the
16(a) reporting requirements of the corporation are concerned. It is
for these reasons that such leaks have seldom been uncovered; perhaps
this is why it is unclear in what circumstances and to what degree
the law holds the participants culpable.
It would seem that the tippee has committed an unlawful act under
Rule lOb-5 when he uses material, undisclosed information ". . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . ." because that
constitutes an "... act [or practice or course of business] which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit..." upon the other party to the
transaction. The only contention put forward to the contrary seems a
bit fatuous: that 10b-5 only applies to certain persons called "insiders,"
even though it literally states that it applies to "any person". The
district court in Texas Gulf Sulphur parrots the latest case law state-
ments to the effect that any person with inside information is an
insider, but unfortunately those cases deal with first-hand recipients
of information, and not with tipper-tippee relationships.40 This de-
cision reaffirms the position taken by the Commission in an administra-
tive hearing involving a tipping of information; the obligation to dis-
close material information exists if there is:
... first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose and not for the benefit of anyone, and second,
[an] ... inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advan-
tage of such information knowing that it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.4"
The circuit court's opinion contains a similiar statement:
The essence of the Rule [10b-5] is that anyone who, trading for
his own account in the securities of a corporation, has "access,
directly or indirectly to information intended to be available for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone"
may not take "advantage of such information knowing it is unavail-
able to those with whom he is dealing," i.e., the investing public.
Matter of Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Insiders, as directors or management officers are, of course, by
this Rule, precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is
also applicable to one possessing the information who may not be
strictly termed an "insider" within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of
the Act. Cady, Roberts, supra. Thus anyone in possession of
bullish and bearish news is that no fiduciary relationship is breached when the latter
is involved because the corporate manager is causing a sale to one who is not a
stockholder. This would have prevented a common law fraud action but does not
seem to affect actions under the Securities Exchange Act.
40. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (directors and
controlling shareholder); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5(1949) (employee).
41. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), cited in S.E.C. v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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material inside information must either disclose it to the invest-
ing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to
protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such inside information remains undisclosed."'
Therefore, the Texas Gulf Sulphur opinions are noteworthy as to the
liability of tippees only to the extent that the statements about the
breadth of the class of persons known as insiders can be said to apply not
only to first-hand recipients of inside information, but to second-hand
recipients as well. The clearest statement of the culpability of tippees
was made by the appellate court, although it is admittedly only dictum:
As Darke's [a defendant] "tippees" are not defendants in this
action, we need not decide whether, if they acted with actual or
constructive knowledge that the material information was undis-
closed, their conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as the
conduct of their insider source, though we note that it certainly
could be equally reprehensible.4"
The circuit court did establish the culpability of tippers. Although
the district court held that ". . . no violations of Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5 have been found as to those defendants who recommended
, 14TGS stock to others . . . , application of a different standard of
materiality led the appellate court to reach the opposite conclusion:
"Darke [a defendant] violated Rule 10b-5 (3) and Section 10(b) by
'tipping' and we remand . . . for a determination of the appropriate
remedy."45 This statement concedes that tippers fall within the unlaw-
fulness contemplated by Rule 10b-5, but there is uncertainty as to
whether they are subject to private rights of action. Perhaps this is
because the Commission sought the recovery rather than the selling
shareholders themselves. Underlying the court's holding is a conclusion
that the so-called privity problem46 raised by the language of Section
42. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FPD. Szc. L. REp. ff 92,251, at 97,177
(2d Cir. 1968).
43. Id. at 97,181 (emphasis supplied). The issue of tippee liability for trans-
actions based on privately disclosed information has been specifically raised by the
S.E.C.'s recent filing of administrative proceedings against Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith, Inc. and certain of its institutional investors. See Wall Street
Journal, Aug. 28, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
44. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 290 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The court continued: "[I]t is not necessary to consider whether an insider who
violates the Statute or the Rule may be liable for purchases made by his 'tippees'."
45. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FXD. Stc. L. Rzsp. 11 92,251, at 97,181
(2d Cir. 1968).
46. This problem was discussed by Judge Bonsai in New Park Mining Company
v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963): "A purchaser or seller of stock
is not limited under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to an action against the other
party to the purchase or sale; he can sue a third person if in connection with the
purchase or sale that person defrauded him." The variety of fact situations that can
give rise to an interpretation of the language in lOb-5 ". . . in connection with the
purchase or sale . . ." make this statement overly simplistic. Perhaps the best state-
ment of the privity requirement was made in dictum by Judge Herlands, also of the
District Court for the Southern District of New York:
Privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants is not a fixed con-
dition precedent to the implication of a private remedy for a statutory violation
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5 ".. . in connection with the purchase or sale..."
is not a stumbling block in finding a tipper's act to be unlawful. The
appellate court analyzed these words with great thoroughness when dis-
cussing the unlawfulness attendant to the issuing by Texas Gulf of a
press release which underplayed the results of the ore find. The release
was found by the court to be misleading and it was held that the privity
problem was not a bar to relief:
Thus, the legislative history of Section 10(b) does not
support the proposition urged upon us by Texas Gulf Sulphur
that Congress intended the limited construction of the "in con-
nection with" phrase applied by the trial court. Moreover, com-
parisons of Section 10(b) with the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 . . . and with the 1936 antifraud amend-
ment of Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . .
demonstrate that when Congress intended that there be a partici-
pation in a securities transaction as a prerequisite of a violation,
it knew how to make that intention clear.47
Although the privity question was discussed at length at that point,
and in fact placed in a separate subsection, the court found it unneces-
sary to even mention it when discussing tipper culpability.
As will be seen later in this article, the liability of tippees is of
little concern in ending the prevalence of flows of inside information;
it is the tippers, the corporate managers, to whom our attention should
be directed. Although the availability of a private right of action against
tippers is a solution which may be unworkable, the important thing
is the recognition that tippers are culpable and, more specifically,
that their actions are unlawful under Rule lob-5 and can be further
regulated under the rule making power of Section 10(b).
III. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM: MATERIALITY
The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation involves information concern-
ing a discovery of ore near Timmins, Ontario, Canada. According
to the findings of the district court,4 the area was first thought to
have promise by the members of a Texas Gulf exploration group in
1959. In the early summer of 1963, options on part of the area were
that injured the plaintiffs, members of the protected class. In that situation,
privity is not an ultimate or operative fact. It is an evidentiary fact to be con-
sidered in conjunction with other material facts in determining whether the rela-
tionship (such as it is) between the plaintiffs and the defendants and the nature
of the particular acts and transactions involve the duty created by the statute.
Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), referred to as "the
most accurate comment on the current state of the law" in Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). For a comprehensive analysis of the
"privity" question, especially as it pertains to the Texas Gulf Sulphur facts, see
Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Cor-
poration Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. RZv. 1361, 1372-82 (1965).
47. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH F4D. Stc. L. RiP. f 92,251, at 97,186
(2d Cir. 1968).
48. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 269-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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purchased and on November 8 of that year the drilling of test holes
began. From November 12, the day when preliminary drilling of the
first hole was completed, visual estimates of its ore content were made,
and attempts to secure further acquisitions in the area under considera-
tion were undertaken, insiders began to make large purchases of
Texas Gulf stock.49 Insider purchases and the tipping of information
continued, as the drilling proceeded, until a public announcement of the
ore find was made on April 16, 1964. Some of the defendants in the
litigation had knowledge of the results of the drilling from the very
beginning, while others came into the picture only when they learned
of the results in the news release prior to its dissemination to the public.
Some merely purchased stock, some only advised others to do so, and
a few did both.
These facts have given rise to private suits against some of the
defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur based upon the failure to disseminate
the information to the public earlier than April 16, 1964.0 It has
been contended that management has the duty to disseminate material
information as it becomes available so that stockholders will not sell
their stock at a price which is based upon knowledge of the company
that does not include this new information. 5' Although the circuit
court was only presented with the question of allegedly misleading
statements, the tone of its opinion may bode well for such an argument.
At the beginning of its discussion of the "in connection with the pur-
chase or sale" language of 10b-5, the court quotes from a House Com-
mittee report on the bill which ultimately became the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934:
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory
that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair
price of a security brings about a situation where the market price
reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipula-
tion tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the
hiding and secreting of information obstructs the operation of the
markets as indices of real value. There cannot be honest mar-
kets without honest publicity .... The disclosure of information
materially important to investors may not instantaneously be
reflected in market value, but despite the intricacies of security
values truth does find relatively quick acceptance on the market.5"
49. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH F4D. Sgc. L. &eP. 92,251, at 97,174(2d Cir. 1968):
During this period, from November 12, 1963 when [drilling of the first
preliminary test hole] was completed, to March 31, 1964 when drilling was
resumed, certain of the individual defendants . . . [and their tippees] purchased
TGS stock or calls thereon. Prior to these transactions these persons had owned
1135 shares of TGS stock and possessed no calls; thereafter they owned a total
of 8235 shares and possessed 12,300 calls.
50. "The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case Touches Off a Flurry of Stockholder Suits,"
Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1965, at 1, col. 6.
51. This same contention applies to the withholding of bearish news, which if
known by the shareholder might have prompted his sale of shares.
52. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FX_. Sec. L. Rtp. J 92,251, at 97,186
(2d Cir. 1968).
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Later in the opinion the court also observed:
[I]t seems clear from the broad legislative purpose Congress
expressed in the Act, and the legislative history of Section 10(b)
that Congress when it used the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" intended only that the device
employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause
reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith,
so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securi-
ties. 58
In the absence, however, of an express holding that management must
make public any available material information, the stock exchanges
have placed this obligation on listed companies by directing them to
disseminate all such information.54 Regardless of the route to such
complete dissemination, a determination of the point at which infor-
mation becomes material must be reached.
The suit by the Commission against the Texas Gulf defendants also
involves a determination of when the information became material;
but this determination involves considerations of materiality different
from those involved in private suits. The duty to disseminate material
information to the public raises a problem if the news is not so certain
and definite as to be capable of presentation in a way that will not mis-
lead persons into giving it more certainty or definiteness than is war-
ranted. Also, it may be in the corporation's interest to withhold the
information. Such was the case in the Texas Gulf Sulphur explora-
tions, because the corporation wanted to buy adjoining land at a price
that would not reflect the possible existence of ore.55 In either situation
management could be subject to liability for premature disclosures.
On the other hand, the duty placed on persons with material inside in-
formation not to purchase stock or tip the information without making
sure that it is information which is available to the other party to the
transaction, does not present these conflicting considerations of stock-
holder protection, nor does it result from any normal corporate obliga-
tion. This duty only arises in conjunction with the "right" to pur-
chase stock in a company one is working for, and, as indicated by
Texas Gulf Sulphur, this right does not exist if the material informa-
tion cannot be disclosed. Furthermore, there is surely an even stronger
case for requiring a corporate manager to forego a disclosure than to
forego a transaction. The important point to recognize is that there
are at first two distinct situations in which the question of materiality
can arise. In metaphorical terms, management is not dealing with a
two-sided coin with one side dictating public dissemination and the
53. Id. at 97,187 (emphasis supplied).
54. See notes 82-84 infra and accompanying text
55, Generally, a purchaser of land is not considered to have acted fraudulently
if he fails to disclose information to the seller concerning natural resources that lie
in the seller's land. There is no hypocrisy in arguing for that rule of law and at the
same time advocating full disclosure in stock transactions. The former has a strong
economic justification in that it encourages the seeking out of our natural resources.Some economic justification can be attributed to insider trading, but not to insider
tipping. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
1968]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
other permitting any limited disclosure management wishes. Instead
there is a middle area in which corporate news must be kept within
the company.
Judge Moore, dissenting from the majority in the Second Circuit,
failed to recognize this middle area. He posed a hypothetical press
release dated November, 1963 which he said the majority "implicitly
suggested": "TGS as a result of drilling on its property in Canada
has knowledge of the more than marginal possibility of a mine of
magnitude over an extensive region of remarkably rich mineraliza-
tion." 6 This he categorizes as ". . . a statement which under the
circumstances and then known facts would have been the height of
recklessness.""7 Judge Moore continued:
In fact, the Commission itself indulges in the very speculation
it condemns for, after conceding. that "the trial court correctly
stated that one drill hole does not establish the existence of a
commercially minable mineral deposit", it straightway contends
that the information which arose after the drilling of this first and
only (for 4/ 2 months) drill hole revealed such "chances of im-
minent success, viewed in the light of the magnitude of the poten-
tial economic benefit to Texas Gulf" as to require disclosure by
insiders desiring to buy TGS securities."'
While Judge Moore conceded that the information was not certain or
definite enough for public dissemination, he disregarded the majority's
admonition to the effect that if a person in possession of material
inside information is "disabled from disclosing it"5 9 or "chooses not
to do so""6° he "must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities concerned while such inside information remains undis-
closed."'" The majority did not suggest that public dissemination
should have been made in November, 1963, nor did it allow private
use of the information. Instead it correctly required insiders to forego
all transactions or tips based on the information until such time as an
announcement could properly be made:
We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed im-
mediately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business
judgment of the corporate officers entrusted with the management
of the corporation within the affirmative disclosure requirements
promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC. Here, a valuable
corporate purpose was served by delaying the publication of the
K-55-1 discovery. We do intend to convey, however, that where
a corporate purpose is thus served by withholding the news of a
56. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FuD. S c. L. Ri. f 92,251, at 97,198(2d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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material fact, those persons who are thus quite properly true to
their corporate trust must not during the period of non-disclosure
deal personally in the corporation's securities or give to outsiders
confidential information not generally available to all the corpora-
tions' stockholders and to the public at large."2
What then is the present meaning of materiality in the context
of insider trading and particularly in the case of tipper-tippee rela-
tionships? To thoroughly understand the circuit court's definition in
Texas Gulf Sulphur, it is useful at the outset to examine earlier, more
general statements by courts, members of the Commission, and com-
mentators. William Cary, past chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, was asked in connection with the suit against
Texas Gulf Sulphur: "Under what circumstances and when may the
managements trade ?" He replied:
[I]n this connection, what type of information must be released?
Here in essence we are trying to define materiality. It is very
difficult at best. We have had three cases thus far; a dividend
cut, a significant ore strike (characterized as one of the most im-
portant finds in modem times), and the Golconda case, a merger -
all extreme situations. I recognize that lines must be drawn on the
conservative side, when for example a company is in the process
of the negotiation of a merger. I think it is safe to say that in-
formation should be disclosed when, if known, it would have a sig-
nificant effect on the market price of the stock.63
The dividend cut case described by Professor Cary is the administrative
proceeding against Cady, Roberts and Company,64 and the significant
ore strike refers to the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. Professor Cary
was speaking after the filing of the complaint in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case but prior to the district court's decision. The trial court went into
great detail about the mining operations in evaluating the knowledge
held by the defendants at various stages of the explorations. It must
have been as great a surprise to Professor Cary as it was to this
writer that the court concluded that material information was in exist-
ence only near the very end of the explorations. The correctness of the
conclusion that results of the explorations from November to April 9
did not constitute information which could be considered material
involves, in part, an analysis of mining which few persons are qualified
62. Id. at 97,179 n.12. The requirement of foregoing a transaction, or the later
development of foregoing a tip has its roots in common law security fraud actions.
In 1903 the court in Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903) stated:
It might be that the director was in possession of information which his duty
to the company required him to keep secret; and, if so, he must not disclose the
fact even to the shareholder, for his obligation to the company overrides that to
an individual holder of the stock. But if the fact so known to the director cannot
be published, it does not follow that he may use it to his own advantage, and to
the disadvantage of one whom he also represents. The very fact that he cannot
disclose prevents him from dealing with one who does not know, and to whom
material information cannot be made known.
63. Farmer, Cary, Fleischer & Halleran, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW
1009, 1014 (1966).
64. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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to undertake. What is the significance as to materiality of the finding
that ". . . one drill core does not establish an ore body, much less
a mine,"' 5 and what can be gleaned about materiality for future mining
situations when the court's conclusions as to the other drilling cores
are not verbalized even to that extent?
In addition to the specialized analysis of mining, Judge Bonsal
made some general statements about materiality:
Material information has been defined as information "which in
reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of
the corporation's stock or securities * * *." [Citations omitted].
It is information which, if known, would clearly affect "investment
judgment," Cady, Roberts [40 S.E.C.], at 911, or which directly
bears on the intrinsic value of a company's stock.66
This definition is not unlike that of Commissioner Budge, which focuses
on ". . . whether the information is important enough that it would
normally influence the judgment of the other party in a securities trans-
action," or whether "the information could be expected to have a sig-
nificant effect on the price of the stock if it were disclosed."67 There
have been further attempts by commentators to define materiality,
68
all of which basically toy with these concepts of "reasonable" or
"normally"; "affect" or "influence"; "directly bears on" or "sig-
nificantly effects" and "intrinsic value" or "price." To point out the
vagueness of these terms, and of the definitions of which they are a
part, might provoke the answer that the words and definitions will
take on meaning on a case-by-case basis and that this is not the first
instance of elasticity in legal formulation. There is perhaps a greater
problem in the use of such words than mere vagueness: that of irre-
deemable and misleading meaninglessness.
The latest definition, enunciated by Judge Waterman, speaking
for the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur, attempts to avoid the
use of such ambiguous terms: "Thus, material facts include not only
information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company,
but also those facts which affect the desire of investors to buy, sell,
or hold the company's securities."69 This very broad and flexible
formulation will nevertheless require further definition and refinement
to ascertain its exact boundaries. What information is there which,
if known by one party, would not affect an investor's attitude toward
a particular security? As a general matter the price of a stock reflects
a general consensus, arrived at rationally or otherwise, as to the ap-
propriate rate of capitalization of a predicted stream of future earnings.
65. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
66. Id. at 280.
67. Suggestions as to a test of materiality by Hamer H. Budge, Member of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, in an address to the New York Chapter of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries on November 18, 1965. A copy of the
address is available on request from the S.E.C.'s Washington, D.C., office.
68. See, e.g., Mundheim, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Complaint, 1966 J. Bus.
LAW 284.
69. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FED. Sec. L. RP. 92,251, at 97,178(2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis supplied).
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The capitalization rate and predicted earnings are in turn based upon
facts about the company, the industry of which the company is a part,
and the economy as a whole. An increase in the quantum of bullish
facts should have an upward effect on the price of the stock. A fact
does not have to have a high degree of certainty or definiteness in
order to be of value. A mere 10% certainty of a 10 million dollar
ore find should lead an investor to calculate a probable effect of 1 mil-
lion dollars on the value of the company,70 which can then be divided
by the number of shares outstanding to arrive at the probable effect on
the price of each share. Similarly, a 107 chance of a gain which is
indefinite in amount, but between 5 and 10 million dollars, can be
said to have a probable effect of at least 500,000 dollars on the value
of the corporation.
The district court in Texas Gulf Sulphur articulated another aspect
of this arithmetical approach to materiality. It emphasized the relation-
ship between the predicted dollar value of the information and the
total dollar value of the company. Judge Bonsal stated:
However, the drilling results up to 7:00 p.m. on April 9 did not
provide such material information. When considered in relation to
the far-flung business of TGS at the time, it cannot be said that
.the drilling results of K-55-1 and K-55-3 constituted material
information, the disclosure of which would have 'had a substantial
impact on the market price of TGS's 10,000,000 outstanding
shares.7'
The circuit court apparently incorporated both of these concepts; Judge
Waterman stated that:
In each case . . . whether facts are material within Rule lOb-5
when the facts relate to a particular event and are undisclosed
by those persons who are knowledgeable thereof will depend at
any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity.72
It might be said that such calculations are based upon figures which
have as little certainty as the definitions of materiality. This is a prob-
lem which faces management when they must decide if news of cor-
porate developments is so certain and definite - so material, as to
warrant and require dissemination to the public. In the case of insider
trading or tipping, questions about the accuracy of the calculations
70. This example is offered for its theoretical substance rather than the financial
propriety of its calculations. The approach taken would be considered a book value
computation which in the appraisal of stock values will often be included in the mix
of calculations in which a prediction of future earnings will have a predominant role.
This seems more appropriate than to include ten million dollars in the future earnings
stream because it is a revenue arising on one occasion and not a recurring source
of revenue.
71. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).




can be 'avoided by simply foregoing the transaction or foregoing the
tip.7 3 In making a determination of materiality it is very tempting to con-
sider the value of the information in question in light of the facts as
they subsequently appear, rather than as of the time the determination
is made. In the Texas Gulf Sulphur situation, a large ore discovery
was indeed made, and large -amounts of trading and tipping by insiders
took place during the period in question. In dealing with these two
developments, the district court stated: "the fact that subsequent
drilling established a major ore body is immaterial .... 'the court must
be guided not by hindsight, but by the facts as they existed at the time
of the challenged transaction' ,,7' and:
The Commission contends, however, that the results of
K-55-1 were material because of the significance attached to
those results by certain defendants. Between the completion of
K-55-1 on Nov. 12, 1963 and the completion of K-55-3 on
April 7, 1964, [certain defendants] spent more than $100,000 in
purchasing stock and calls on the stock of TGS. These defendants
could bring considerable expertise to bear in evaluating the results
of K-55-1 and their purchases may have been prompted by an
educated guess that K-55-1 would lead to the discovery of a mine.
Therefore, a question is presented as to whether information
which may have special significance to an insider because of
'his professional background, is material.
A similar question would be presented where an engineer in
the research department of a publicly-held corporation believes
that he may have invented a process which will substantially in-
crease the corporation's earnings or where a chemist in a large
pharmaceutical firm thinks that he may have devised a chemical
formula which can cure cancer. In these instances it can be
assumed that the insider, because of his educated guess, will be
enthusiastic and his enthusiasm may lead him to purchase stock
in his company and to recommend the stock to his associates
and friends even though his educated guess may turn out to be
wrong. It may be argued that such purchases are "unfair" to the
outside stockholders and come within the ambit of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. Purchases on the basis of educated guesses may
be viewed as an attempt to secure additional corporate compensa-
tion. Cary, "Corporate Standards and Legal Rules," 50 Calif. L.
Rev. 408 (1962).
73. The implications of this approach to materiality are not entirely clear. In
addition to the difficulties attendant to making such a determination, a balancing test
of this nature could encourage a further extension to an investigation of the signifi-
cance of the impact on each shareholder who enters into a transaction without the
benefit of this additional information. Although such an extension appears unlikely
at this time, it is not entirely inconsistent with the attitude exhibited by either of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur courts.
74. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), citing
Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, CCH FED. Sxc. L. 1I'. f 91,523, at 94,956
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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However, most insiders necessarily have educated guesses
about the prospects of particular company programs. If it is held
that purchases made on the basis of educated guesses are pro-
scribed by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, insiders who purchase
stock in their company will do so at their peril. If they announce
their educated guesses before purchasing and their guesses turn
out to be wrong, they would be subject to suit; and if they purchase
and keep their educated guesses to themselves and they turn out
to be right, they would again be subject to suit. The creation of
such a dilemma would result in insiders not buying at all although
insiders should be encouraged to have a stake in the companies for
which they work.
The outside stockholder can never match the knowledge of an
insider who necessarily knows more about the company and is in
a better position to evalute its prospects. It may be that the "fair-
ness" overtones of Cady, Roberts indicate a trend toward the
elimination of all insider purchasing. But even were the court pre-
pared to accept the proposition that all insider trading is unfair,
a proposition of doubtful validity at best, it would be deterred
by the admonition of Judge Learned Hand that it is not "desirable
for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of antici-
pating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose
birth is distant .... 75
To the extent that the topic of the above is insider trading there is
at least some merit to the court's contentions, but this validity does not
extend to insider tipping. Such tipping has nothing to do with the stake
which corporate managers have in their company, and, therefore, no
perilous situation need arise. Educated guesses are valuable information
which probably cannot be disseminated to the public, perhaps should
not be traded upon, and definitely should not be disclosed to a few per-
sons. To say, as the district court did elsewhere, that "information
is not material merely because it would be of interest to the speculator
on Bay Street or Wall Street ' 76 or that "the test of materiality must
necessarily be a conservative one ' 77 may be satisfactory for insider
trading purposes but not for those of insider tipping. In the latter
case, -there are no policy considerations to balance against the "unfair-
ness" involved.
Although the circuit court was no more willing to expressly pro-
hibit all insider purchasing than the district court, two of its statements
may in many instances accomplish the same thing." Rejecting much of
75. 258 F. Supp. at 283-84.
76. Id. at 280.
77. Id.
78. This statement is not meant to apply to information which in the normal
business context would be considered insignificant. This attitude further emphasizes
the notion that some information, while not material enough to require dissemination
or a prohibition on insider purchases, still should not be tipped.
An insider is not, of course, always foreclosed from investing in his own com-
pany merely because he may be more familiar with company operations than
are outside investors. An insider's duty to disclose information or his duty to
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the trial court's characterization of the nature of materiality, Judge
Waterman stated that:
The only regulatory objective is that access to material in-
formation be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing
more than the disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may draw
upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own invest-
ment decisions with knowledge equal to that of insiders.
This is not to suggest, however, ,as did the trial court, that
"the test of materiality must necessarily be a conservative one,
particularly since many actions under Section 10(b) are brought
on the basis of hindsight," . . . in the sense that the materiality
of facts is to be assured solely by measuring the effect the knowl-
edge of the facts would have on prudent or conservative investors.
As we stated in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F. 2d 457, 462,
"The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a reasonable man
would attach importance ... in determining his choice of action
in the transaction in question," . . . (Emphasis supplied). This,
of course, encompasses any fact . . . "which in reasonable and
objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's
stock or securities. . . ." [Citations omitted]. Such a fact is
a material fact and must be effectively disclosed to the investing
public prior to the commencement of insider trading in the cor-
poration's securities. The speculators and chartists of Wall and
Bay Streets are also "reasonable" investors entitled to the same
legal protection afforded conservative traders.79
In deciding that the existence of insider activity may be of significant
probative force in a subsequent judicial determination of materiality,
the circuit court may have placed an intolerable burden on corporate
managers who attempt to act in good faith. In effect, the court has
said that the value, or materiality, of information can be measured
in very large part by the extent of insider trading. Accordingly, even
if insiders or others accurately determine that the information at their
disposal is not material at a particular point in time and proceed to
trade on it, a court, following the language of the Second Circuit,
may in fact allow itself to "be guided... by hindsight..." :
Finally, a major factor in determining whether the K-55-1
discovery was a material fact is the importance attached to the
drilling results by those who knew about it. In view of other
related recent developments favorably affecting TGS, participation
by an informed person in a regular stock purchase program, or
even sporadic trading by an informed person, might lend only
abstain from dealing in his company's securities arises only in "those situations
which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain
to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if [the extra-
ordinary situation is] disclosed."
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nominal support to the inference of the materiality of K-55-1
discovery; nevertheless, the timing by those who knew of it of
their stock purchases and their purchases of short-term calls -
purchases in some cases by persons who had never before purchased
calls or even TGS stock - virtually compels the inference that
the insiders were influenced by the drilling results. This insider
trading activity, which surely constitutes highly pertinent evidence
and the only truly objective evidence of the materiality of the
K-55-1 discovery, was apparently disregarded by the court below
in favor of the testimony of defendant's expert witnesses, all of
whom "agreed that one drill core does not establish an ore body,
much less a mine." 80
The circuit court's definition of materiality, accompanied by its
seemingly stringent regulation of insider transactions, appears to apply
equally to the problem of tipping. The court does not frame its test
in terms of the different policy considerations present for each type of
situation. Materiality could perhaps be divided into three categories
similar to those classifying the abuse of inside information: the true
insider who has a duty to decide what information is so material it must
be disseminated to the public; the person buying shares and possessing
inside information who must decide whether that information is so
immaterial it need not be disclosed to the other party to the transaction;
and those persons, especially corporate managers, who must decide if
the information is so immaterial it can be disclosed to a few persons.
At the trial Judge Bonsal concluded that none of the tippers was
in possession of material inside information; on appeal it was found
that they were. Each court applied its test of materiality indiscrimi-
nately to trading and tipping, and, while the result on the appellate
level may be correct, courts must in the future view materiality dis-
tinctly in each context.
IV. PRIVATE ATTEMPTS AT 'REGULATION'
A. The Exchanges and the NASD
The Special Study states: "Federal law is in the main not con-
cerned with 'unofficial' corporate publicity.""' The exchanges seem
to have taken a more aggressive role in this delicate area. The New
York Stock Exchange requires listed companies to make prompt dis-
closure of developments "which -might affect security values or influence
investment decisions of stockholders or the investing public." 82 The
American Stock Exchange has a similar policy, and the Midwest and
Pacific Coast exchanges require prompt disclosure at least to the extent
of dividend news. The National Association of Securities Dealers,
or NASD, also requires prompt disclosure by over-the-counter listed
80. Id. at 97,180.
81. SpzciAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 93.
82. Nzw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, A20-A22.
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companies.' A recent addition to the New York Stock Exchange
Company Manual states:
At some point it usually becomes necessary to involve other
persons to conduct preliminary studies or assist in other prepara-
tions for contemplated transactions, e.g., business appraisals, tenta-
tive financing arrangements, attitude of large outside holders, avail-
ability of major blocks of stock, engineering studies, market
analyses and surveys, etc. Experience has shown that maintain-
ing security at this point is virtually impossible. Accordingly, fair-
ness requires that the Company make an immediate public an-
nouncement as soon as confidential disclosures relating to such
important matters are made to "outsiders." 4
Without disparaging these "prompt disclosure" requirements, it
must be realized that they only begin to solve the problem of non-public
disclosure. The obvious implication of these rules is that information
which must be disseminated to the public immediately cannot be told
to a few persons. If the exchange says nothing more, the unfortunate
suggestion is that there is no middle area in which public dissemination
is not required but in which limited disclosure is prohibited; in meta-
phorical terms, disclosure becomes a two-sided coin.
A recent publication of the New York Stock Exchange, The Cor-
porate Director and the Investing Public,5 addresses itself to the prob-
lem of non-public disclosure. It virtually eliminates any middle area and
instead attempts to establish a procedure by which limited disclosures
can be made in a fair and evenhanded way. The booklet's section
"Timely and Adequate Disclosure of Corporate News"8 6 begins by
delineating the types of corporate news which must immediately be
disseminated -to the public. It then states:
Annual reports, quarterly reports, and publicity releases cannot, by
their nature, detail all of the operations of the company. There-
fore, it is highly desirable that corporations follow a so-called 'open
door' policy for the benefit not only of stockholders but also security
analysts, financial writers, and others who have legitimate interest
in the various factors affecting a company's business.
A company should not give information to one inquirer which
it would not give to another, nor should it reveal information
it would not willingly give to the press for publication. By the
,same token a company should not withhold information in which
stockholders, the investing public, and analysts have a war-
ran-table interest.
83. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 99.
84. THE Nnw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § A2, Part 1, at A-18
(July 18, 1968).
85. This booklet can be obtained free by writing to the New York Stock Ex-
change, 11 Wall Street, New York, N.Y. 10005.
86. Ntw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND THE INVESTING
PUBLIC 4-6.
(VOL. XXVIII
DISCLOSURE OF INSIDE INFORMATION
To assure -that the release of corporate information is handled
capably, consistently, and authoritatively, many companies desig-
nate one or more key executives to speak for the company in all
matters that might affect security values or influence investment
decisions. There is much to recommend this procedure.
Normally a director should limit his discussions with outsiders to
information which is publicly available or which would not be clas-
sified as confidential under company policy. However, there may
be rare occasions when a director should speak out publicly on some
important matter which management should have disclosed."
These guidelines are inadequate in several respects. It is unrealistic
to think that the small investor will have the same opportunity to
walk through the "open door" as financial analysts and writers and
friends of management. It is not possible to answer everyone's in-
quiries, and in the final analysis only friends and "professionals" will
be able to speak to management. This is especially true in view of the
exchange's -suggestion that "one or more key executives" do all the
speaking. Even assuming the implementation of an "open door"
policy, giving information to all callers is, nevertheless, impractical.
When information is disseminated through the news services, these
problems largely disappear.
These objections are compounded by the fact that the exchange
has set a meaningless standard for limiting disclosure of the informa-
tion which is not immediately distributed to the public. Outsiders are
only to receive information "which is publicly available" or "which
would not be classified as confidential under company policy." The first
clause could not have been meant to set the standard because the
exchange states that the news in the public sphere is not sufficient.
The second clause seems to state the standard as one of non-confidential
information in a protection-of-company sense. This does not further
our body of "regulation" because directors are already under that duty
to the corporation.
It should be noted that the exchange has taken effective steps to
reduce the extent of leaks of "inside" information. The Corporate Di-
rector booklet states: "The market action of a company's security
should be closely watched at these times [when significant corporate
deliberations are taking place] and the company should be prepared to
make a public announcement of the matter under consideration if this
becomes necessary.""8 The exchange's stock watching department keeps
a close surveillance of market activity and will encourage a listed
company to make a public statement if it detects heavy trading on "in-
side" information. A suspension of trading in the stock may be ordered
if time is needed to disseminate the information. Such action by the
exchange and listed corporations usually involves corporate news





poration on February 24, 1966 issued a forecast of its 1966 earnings
because the corporation felt that some investors had ascertained the
figure. Although a prediction of earnings is a valuable piece of informa-
tion, a prediction this early in the fiscal year would not be considered,
under present-day thinking, to require public disclosure. It is for this
reason that the New York Times called the Studebaker announcement
an "unusual step." 9
Regardless of the extensive use that could be made of the "public
statement," it must be remembered that it is only called into play after
persons are suspected to have traded on "inside" information. The real
cure lies in enforcing a prohibition against the private disclosure. Fur-
thermore, the "public statement" should not become the tail that wags
the dog as the following quote from the Special Study seems to indi-
cate: "The exchange [New York Stock Exchange] takes the position
that a matter still in the planning or developmental state, 'such as a
prospective merger or new product, should be announced as soon as
it appears likely that a sizable number of persons will hear of it."9
This approach should be used when it is impossible to enforce a rule
prohibiting private disclosures, and not before.
B. "Self-Regulation' by Corporations
The New York Stock Exchange suggests that companies make
periodic reviews of their disclosure policy and internal security prac-
tices. 9 The General Electric Corporation has adopted a disclosure
policy which provides that: ". . . no 'substantive' information can be
given out on a limited scale, such as to a security analyst or enterpris-
ing reporter trying to develop an exclusive story. By substantive, the
company means any kind of information that is significant enough to
influence the price of GE's stock."9" Although the bounds of "substan-
tive" information are not spelled out in any detail, there is still some
value in having a company verbalize such an attitude. Internal security
practices at the Coca Cola Company include a requirement that all em-
ployees sign a sworn statement to the effect that they will not divulge
"inside" information they acquire while at work.9" Some firms play
an important role in protecting "inside" information after it leaves the
confines of a corporation. Printers of corporate financial statements,
prospectuses, and other documents containing confidential data usually
divide an assignment in such a way that no one employee will be able
to grasp the essence of the material.9 4 Many news media have rules to
prevent their employees from capitalizing on "inside" information that
arises because of "hold-for-release" announcements."
89. "Studebaker Corporation Issues Earnings Prediction," N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1966, at 40, col. 8.
90. Special Study, supra note 9, at 98.
91. Nsw YORK STOCK EXCHANG , supra note 86, at 6.
92. Wall Street Journal, supra note 6, at 12, col. 3.
93. Id.
94. "Financial Printers Guard Against Wrong Use of Data," Wall Street Journal,
April 27, 1965, at 12, col. 4.
95. Wall Street Journal, supra note 7, at 12, col. 3. This article describes an
interesting situation in which the Avis Company requested the Dow Jones News
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The practice of making public statements to bring equality to the
market place when it becomes apparent that some investors are trading
on "inside" information is primarily a tool of the exchanges. It is
doubtful that many companies would make such announcements if the
threat of a suspension of trading did not exist.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Ideal Market Operation; Cause and Effect of Imperfections
Persons who engage in business transactions have a desire to
act rationally and profitably in those transactions. It is helpful to be
able to gather many of the facts necessary in order to make an intelli-
gent decision; it is crucial to have available all the facts obtainable
by the other party to the transaction. In stock trading, if there is no
inequality in fact availability, profits are reaped only after a high degree
of business acumen is applied to the facts. The investor, with the aid
of his broker and Wall Street analysts, must compute the price at which
the stock should be selling. In the final analysis this entails a prediction
of future earnings and a judgment as to the rate of capitalization to be
applied. An examination of the role of the computer on Wall Street
is helpful in picturing this ideal form of market operation. The com-
puter is equipped with a complex mathematical formula that takes into
account dividends, earnings, company growth rates, management
quality, risks inherent in the industry, and other factors. After the
facts are "fed in," the function of the computer is to figure the "real
value" of the stock and to compare it with the current price." The
computer's calculations are only of value if the facts it receives com-
prise the totality of information available to other investors.97
When one party to a stock transaction is acting on accurate infor-
mation disclosed to him by a corporate manager, which is not available
to the other party -to the transaction, the latter investor has been
"defrauded." To the extent that present-day thinking does not reach
this conclusion, it is fostering several bad results. Not only has the
party on the "wrong" side of the transaction suffered a financial loss
because he did not have the right "contacts," but also he has not received
a financial reward for the intelligent use of business acumen that he
might deserve. If he is forced to end trading in the market because
of further such losses, a potentially high degree of business judgment
may go unrewarded. By the same token, the person on the "right"
side of the transaction may be a loser in subsequent transactions. He
has been encouraged to trade on inside information which, if accepted
Service to postpone publication of its quarterly earnings for one week so that Avis
stockholders could receive the information ahead of the public. Dow Jones refused
and published the information immediately. This is, in effect, one corporation impos-
ing "self-regulation" upon another corporation.
96. "Electronic Tipsters," Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 1965, at 1, col. 1.
97. The comprehensiveness of the computer's procedure does not mean that the
human analyst will eventually disappear or will have to justify his existence by
obtaining "tips" from corporate managements. Analysts who are working with com-
puters find that there is a great amount of information that the machine cannot take
into account, such as the "emotional" factor of market operation and the state of the
market as a whole. Id.
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in the form of rumor, may be inaccurate. 98 On a different level it can
truly be said that society loses when business transactions are conducted
on such an unsophisticated level. When "what you know" is determined
by "whom you know," the business community is reduced to a non-
professional status. 9
The problems are increased when one realizes that private dis-
closures of information by management do not always reach investors
directly. News tends to become distorted when it passes through many
people, even if it is accurate in its first communication. This is the
phenomenon of the Wall Street rumor. It owes its existence to the
fact that tips of inside information have been prevalent and, at times,
accurate. The New York Stock Exchange suggests that:
Occasionally, it may be necessary for corporate officials to deny
false rumors or clarify misunderstandings which are affecting the
market in their company's stock. A quick, clear announcement to
the press and wire services along with immediate notice to the Ex-
change is the most effective procedure under these circumstances. °0
This does not cure the harmful results that have occurred before the
public statement is made. The investor who has relied on a rumor
may have traded stock on exaggerated information. If the rumor is
accurate in part, the investor who does not hear of it, or who does not
believe in relying upon rumors, may be entering into transactions with
persons who, -to some degree, have inside information. Furthermore,
a vast group of non-investors may be harmed when stock prices are
based on inaccurate information. Business deals, such as some corporate
mergers, that draw on the price of publicly traded shares rely upon
stocks being accurately valued.
Two basic reasons can be suggested for the seeming propensity
of corporate managers to divulge "inside" information to particular
individuals. The first concerns corporate news which is not so certain
in fact to permit disclosure to the public. As was stated in Goodwin
v. Agassiz: "Disclosure of the theory [that copper deposits might
exist], if it ultimately was proved to be erroneous or without foundation
in fact, might involve the defendants [officers of the corporation owning
the property] in litigation with those who might act on the hypothesis
98. The net result can be a loss of liquidity in the market place to the extent that
traders who are scared away because of a lack of "contacts" are not replaced by
traders with "contacts."
99. The New York Times recently reported:
Manuel F. Cohen, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, warned
yesterday that public confidence in the fairness of securities markets could be
undermined by improper use of inside information.
"That confidence, so necessary to the continued healthy growth of our
markets, cannot be preserved if there is a belief - indeed a suspicion - that
insiders are taking advantage of information gained by virtue of their relation-
ship to the company or possession of privileged information, even if the insiders
are complying with the letter of all the technical guidelines that the ingenuity
of the commission can devise," the chairman said.
"Insiders Urged to Preserve Public's Trust," New York Times, May 22, 1968, at 61,
col. 4.
100. Ntw YORK STOcK EXCHANGE, supra note 86, at 6.
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that it was correct."' 0'1 Such information might be sufficiently valuable
that persons with knowledge of it, as in Goodwin, will buy the corpora-
tion's stock. The increased demand will raise the price of the stock;
this can be advantageous to management. Directors and officers who
own shares in the corporation will be able to sell at a higher price,10 2
and their chances of retaining their office or seat on the board of
directors will be greater. These factors are perhaps only important
in the short-run; in the final analysis all of the information about a com-
pany will be available to all persons and the company's stock will
have its appropriate price. However, to many corporate managers
it is the present that counts, and the disclosure of news that is not yet
"ripe" for public announcement may produce a larger profit on the sale
of stock and extended tenure with the corporation.
The second reason for management's disclosures of inside infor-
mation to a few persons is not dependent on any "immaterial" or
"bullish" character of the news. The explanation is friendship. Tippees
often profit from the information they have received. If the news is
"bullish," stock can be purchased before its price goes up; if it is
"bearish," a tippee can sell shares he owns or sell short before the
news reaches the market. The tipper will probably receive a financial
reward for his services. In any event, he has created or fostered a
"friendship" which may prove to be valuable in the future.' 5
B. A Solution
There are, then, two recipients of the 'harm caused by the flow
of inside information: the individuals who are on the "wrong" side of
the transaction, and the market place as a whole. A scheme of reform
must consider both. "Defrauded" investors must be compensated and
tippers must be deterred.
To the extent that money damages act as a deterrent, both ob-
jectives could be obtained by recognizing a broad liability of tippers to
the injured stockholders. This liability could be very great, especially
if tippers were held responsible for transactions by remote tippees
who did not receive the information directly from the original tipper.
It seems much fairer and more appropriate, however, to hold tippees
liable to the injured parties. This would have a deterring effect on the
solicitation of private disclosures; in order to effectively cut off private
flows, however, the original tippers, corporate managers, must be held
101. 283 Mass. 358, 364, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933).
102. The profit may be kept only if the transaction is outside the six-month period
of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
103. Some friendships exist that do not depend on financial incentives. An unusual
example of this came to the attention of this writer not long ago. It involved the
disclosure by a corporation to various mutual funds holding shares of the corporation
that a poor earnings record was to be announced shortly. It is possible that the
motive for the "tip" was the expectation that the mutual funds would be more likely
to purchase the corporation's shares in the future if they could be apprised of un-
favorable news ahead of the market. However, some persons who were familiar with
the management of the corporation suggested that the disclosure was made because
the officers, almost all of whom are of "humble origins," were overwhelmed by the




criminally culpable. The Second Circuit held that Rule 10b-5 reaches
the conduct of tippers,' and under Section 32(a) : "Any person who
willfully violates any provision of this title, or any rule or regulation
thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance
of which is required under the terms of this title,... shall upon con-
viction be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both, . . ."105
The question then is under what circumstances or for divulging
what information should a tipper's conduct be subject to criminal pen-
alty? In light of the abuses described in the preceding sections, it might
be suggested that all communications between corporate managers and a
limited number of persons be absolutely prohibited. All corporate news
emanating from the confines of management would reach the public
through the news services. This solution removes the difficult task of
determining what information is sufficiently "immaterial" to permit
disclosure by management to a few persons. As pointed out earlier,
the required proof of materiality can still be a stumbling block in hold-
ing a tipper culpable although almost all information can be viewed
as having an influence on an investor's judgment. Also, to the extent
that materiality should have any meaning in tipping situations, that
meaning should be more inclusive than the standard used for the per-
missibility of insider trading, and much more inclusive than the stand-
ard used to decide whether information is so material that it must
be disseminated to the public. This solution also reflects a justifiable
skepticism of the .theory that no one is harmed by limited disclosures
because the information eventually filters down to all who want it.
Such complete dissemination is achieved through rumor, which has a
tendency to distort the information and to communicate it to persons at
different times.
Regardless of the value of such a neat rule, it must be rejected.
In the first place, a prohibition of all -limited disclosures would probably
be unworkable, whether it took the form of Commission rule, exchange
rule, or court doctrine. The problems of enforcement would be too
great. Furthermore, the legal process caveat that rules which are
unenforceable breed a general disrespect for other rules is applicable
here. There is something of this in the following quote from an article
in the Wall Street Journal on stock "tips": "Rules that try to answer
every question and protect every fool always cause more trouble than
they cure. There's no need -to read dire plots into every luncheon con-
versation."' 06 Secondly, an absolute prohibition does not preserve
those limited communications which may be beneficial to the investing
community if not done in an abusive way. °7 The news services would
be strained if called upon to disseminate the information which now
104. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (a) (1964).
106. Royster, "Who's Inside?," Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1965, at 16, col. 3.
107. The best example is the "reasonable basis" rule mentioned on page 192
supra. It is also obvious that no rule that is adopted should interfere with disclosures
of information to banks or other organizations such as regulatory agencies where
the information is required by law or as a business necessity or convenience.
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reaches the market through security analyst reports. With the excep-
tion of management's prediction of earnings,' the individual security
analyst should be able to collect all information about a company the
corporate managers are willing to disclose to him if he is prepared to
keep it confidential and to make his completed report available to the
public. Such reports can exist in a scheme of market operation based
on equality.'09 To the extent that security analysts are the only persons
receiving inside information, purchases made on direct communications
of such information will be easy to detect. In the case of a wide-spread
leak, the source of the disclosure can be narrowed to the analysts who
have communicated with the company. Only after a breach of the con-
fidential disclosure would it be necessary to decide whether the informa-
tion was of the kind that must be disseminated to the public if it is
to be disclosed at all.
Security analyst meetings should not come under the "privileged"
status outlined above. Too many analysts will receive inside informa-
tion to afford easy detection of its use or disclosure. Such news should
simultaneously be disseminated to the public through the news services.
The hard problem is whether the meetings should be prohibited unless
all information not already in the public sphere is transmitted to the
public, or whether a fact-by-fact determination of "materiality" can be
made. Confusion on this issue appears in an address by Ruddick C.
Lawrence, Vice President of the New York ,Stock Exchange:
[A] frequent question is: Should information given to market
analysts be made available to news media? The answer is: Yes,
the essential data should be available to all. If an executive's
address to an analyst group will include previously unreleased in-
formation, a press release should be prepared for simultaneous
distribution. The best guide here is, when in doubt, prepare
the release.' 0
At first Mr. Lawrence seems to be saying that all information not
already available to the public must be included in the press release.
At the end, however, he suggests that there may be some doubt as to
what should be included. This sounds more like a judgment as to
materiality than a search for news which has already been distributed
to the public. Mr. Lawrence's use of the word "essential" is itself
ambiguous: does he mean it to be synonymous with material, or that
jokes should be omitted before sending the address to the news services?
The more stringent rule is preferable. The opportunity to so easily
avoid a determination of materiality is very tempting. It is also the
only sure method of ending a daily public display of the importance
108. See pp. 220-21 infra.
109. Although the availability of facts is better achieved when the information
appears in newspapers, the ability to obtain an analyst's report by simply walking
into the brokerage house must be considered sufficient. Greater equality through
greater accessibility can only come about when the major newspapers expand their
financial news coverage.
110. Lawrence, You, Your Company, and the Timely Disclosure Rules of the
NYSE, address to the Public Relations Society of America, November 23, 1965.
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of inside information."' The result of requiring the release of all
information not already available to the public may be that analyst meet-
ings will disappear from the scene. In the first place, the news media
may not be capable of fulfilling the task of simultaneous distribution of
all this information. Secondly, the analyst will have little incentive to
attend meetings." 2 If this is the price that must be paid to reduce the
flow of inside information, it is a bargain." 3
Aside from the suggested prohibitions on disclosures to security
analysts, other private disclosures by corporate managers, now per-
mitted, should be held unlawful because of the content of the informa-
tion. There are two kinds of information, not now considered material,
which account for a large part of the flows of inside information and
which are so material in every instance that they should not be privately
disclosed.
First, the prediction of earnings by corporate officers and directors
should remain in the confines of management until the time, if ever,
it is disseminated to the public through the news services. The routine
prediction of earnings by management is not at present considered
to be the kind of information which is so clearly "material" that it must
be immediately disseminated to the public."' Nor does there seem to
be any feeling that it must not be disclosed to a limited number of
persons. The Special Study uncovered instances in which individuals
and groups received a prediction of earnings, and concluded that the
harm lies in the possibility that the prediction is inaccurate.1'5
An earnings prediction intelligently arrived at is crucial to invest-
ment decisions. It goes to the very heart of security prices. Corporate
managers are uniquely qualified to make the prediction. They not
only have available current financial and other data but also, as one
writer has explained it: "Those who spend a lifetime in any business
acquire feelings about the way things are going, often with only vague
facts -to pin to.' 11 6 A few words such as "earnings will be up" or "it
looks like we'll earn about $.50 for the quarter" may summarize all of
111. In 1965 there were approximately 5,500 security analyst meetings, many of
which were not covered by the news media. See pp. 193-94 and note 16 supra.
112. Under the proposed solution, question-and-answer periods would be eliminated.
Therefore, the only advantage to be gained by attending, rather than reading the
newspaper account of the meeting, is the chance of establishing a personal contact
with the speaker. This type of analyst-management communication would not receive
a "privileged" status because it does not contemplate a thorough study of the company
followed by a report that is available to the public.
113. It might be argued that the flow of inside information which takes place at
security analyst meetings would be replaced by individuals contacting management
to a greater extent than is done at present. However, the proposed restrictions on
analyst meetings, along with the suggestions for broadening materiality discussed
herein, should convince corporate managers that they are on dangerous ground when
they disclose information to "outsiders." Also, analyst meetings have themselves been
responsible for the establishment of contacts, see, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9,
at 78, which do not always lead to reports that are made publicly available.
114. See, e.g.. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 86, at 4. However, dis-
closure of a predicted drop in the earnings of Douglas Aircraft is the basis for the
S.E.C.'s recently filed administrative proceedings against Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith, Inc. and certain of its institutional investors. See Wall Street
Journal, Aug. 28, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
115. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 90.
116. Royster, supra note 106.
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the inside information available to management. It is not surprising
then, that security analysts attempt to elicit this information from cor-
porate managers. One analyst told the Special Study: "I can't imagine
any group of analysts being together with company officials and not
asking [for earnings predictions]. That would be one of the first
questions we would ask .... ,,1 The New York Society of Security
Analysts has publicly stated that it thinks analysts deserve to receive
this information:
The heart of security analysis is the forecast. Management's fore-
cast, based upon sound planning can be of great help to the
analyst.... The company is justified in not giving current figures
to analysts prior to general publication but it can be helpful to the
company and the analyst if the trend of current earnings is dis-
cussed.""l
Security analysts, regardless of the confidential capacity in which
they receive the predictions, should be subject to the same rules that
apply to others who seek inside information. The reason for allowing
analysts to communicate with management is that the information they
receive will aid them in reaching .their own forecast of earnings. Fur-
thermore, management's prediction of earnings is too valuable a piece
of information to entrust to anyone.
This addition to the category of material information will not
only be a significant step toward ending the practice of trading on tips,
but it will also ,have a high chance of successful operation. Experience
in the area leads to the conclusion that voluntary compliance with the
prohibition would be forthcoming. Persons will often go to great
lengths to hide the fact that a prediction of earnings had been disclosed.
Although it may be permitted, they have a visceral feeling that it
should not be. A public confirmation of their belief would afford cor-
porate managers a more forceful justification when pressured for a
prediction of earnings to refuse to disclose this information. If leakage
occurs, the problem of detection is not as great as with other kinds of
inside information. Knowledge of an ore strike, for example, is ob-
tainable by many persons outside of the company, such as geologists
and landowners residing near the strike. Management's prediction
of earnings, on the other hand, is a creation of the mind based on data
accumulated within the company. It is usually clear which officers
are privy to the financial records of the corporation on a day-to-day
basis and they and their tippees should be held responsible if leaks occur.
117. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 90.
118. Npw YORK SocMTY oP SECURiTY ANALYSTS, CORPORATE RtLATIONS 4. The
term "trend of current earnings" is an example of circumvention of a prohibition
against disclosures of earnings predictions. An inquirer should not be able to say:
"I cannot ask for an earnings prediction but how do the figures on costs and sales
look?" This information is in some cases already covered by management's duty not
to disclose facts that would aid the company's competitors. Perhaps the standards of
the New York Stock Exchange, as discussed earlier, include this situation. It is
unlikely, however, that the Exchange contemplated the reasons given in this article
when it constructed this "rule."
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Second, the concept of materiality must include information which
does not relate to the intrinsic worth of the company but does bear on
the price of its stock. This standard should be applied to two kinds of
information which clearly fall within its language: an imminent maga-
zine article, and a stock "push." This "news" does not usually emanate
from management, but it is just as potent in creating unevenhanded
stock transactions as the more common types of inside information.
The knowledge of an impending magazine article about a corporation
has been shown to be a valuable piece of information because the price
of the corporation's stock usually rises immediately after the article is
published." 9 The write-up may include only information which is
already available to the public, but it is the highlighting of these facts
in a widely circulated periodical that causes the price of the stock to
advance. The Special Study describes instances in which writers have
profited from this information, 2 ° but, in keeping with its myopic con-
cern, it only fears that such situations may produce exaggerated claims
about the company because of the writer's ownership of stock. As is
common with the more usual forms of inside information, the possessor
often communicates what he knows to others,' 2' creating a tipper-tippee
relationship. The stock "push" derives its value from the creation of
interest in a stock. A group of people make large purchases of a stock
with the hope that the rest of ,the market will join in. Success is often
the result because other investors assume the initial purchases were
based on a lead of inside information, or that the stock is being
"pushed," and they may be able to make a few "points." Like the
chain-letter enterprise, the trick is to get in from the beginning. Al-
though ,the purchase of stock with the intention of creating market
demands is prohibited under Section 9 (a) (2) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, ' 22 it would be helpful to include the knowledge of it under
the rubric of material inside information. Moreover, corporate manage-
ment may sometimes help such an effort by informing a few persons
of corporate news not available to the public. This information, re-
gardless of whether it is considered material in a normal context, should
be so defined when it is knowingly part of a stock "push."
VI. CONCLUSION
There is growing evidence of the prevalence of tipping of inside
information about corporations to persons who purchase stock based
upon that information. Groups of security analysts exist mainly for the
purpose of holding meetings at which corporate managers disclose in-
formation which is not publicly known or available. Financial public
relations firms also aid the private flow of corporate information. This
has created a class of persons who are trading stock without the same
information, or the same access to information, as the other parties to
119. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 70-78.
120. Id. This is shown by specific communications in some cases, and in others
by a general rise in the price of the stock shortly after publication of the article.
121. Id. at 83.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(2) (1964).
[VOL. XXVIII
DISCLOSURE OF INSIDE INFORMATION
the transaction. It has also resulted in a market place in which "what
you know" is dependent in large part upon "whom you know."
Rule 10b-5 as interpreted by the courts requires a showing that the
undisclosed information was material. In reversing the district court's
decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, that the insider traders and tippers were
not dealing with material information, the Second Circuit has promul-
gated a new definition of materiality. The great breadth of this test is
justified by a recognition that almost all information is of value to
traders however uncertain and indefinite it may be. A question still
remains as to how this definition will be applied by other courts to other
facts. There should be a difference in the meaning of materiality for
each context in which it arises; that is, for the failure by management
to make a public dissemination of material corporate news, for insider
trading, and for insider tipping. The above analysis suggests that
at the least it should be recognized that news which is not sufficiently
material to require dissemination to the public, or to require disclosure
for insider trading purposes, is not necessarily so immaterial as to be
available for private disclosure. At the most it could be said that private
disclosures serve no justifiable or worthwhile purpose and therefore
should be absolutely prohibited regardless of how immaterial the
information might be. A middle course would suggest that security
analysts be permitted access to relevant corporate data so long as this
information is not the "end product," i.e., a prediction of earnings, and
so long as they are prepared to keep it in their confidence until a time
when they will make it available to all. All other disclosures would be
prohibited unless they are required by law, such as under the "reason-
able basis rule" or in the case of reports to regulatory agencies, or unless
a business necessity or convenience exists, such as reports to banks.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is vested with the power
to adopt such rules under Section 10(b) and have them enforced by
criminal sanctions under Section 32. The Commission should utilize
that power. If this is not done, other courts in insider tipping cases
should follow the Second Circuit's expanded concept of materiality,
recognizing the policy distinctions between tipping and trading, and
including as material such obvious areas as predictions of earnings and
information which bears on the price of a stock but not necessarily on
the intrinsic value of the company.
The law in the area of unevenhanded stock transactions has been
primarily concerned with insider trading rather than insider tipping.
In both situations, the result is a "defrauded" investor, but where tip-
ping is involved the culpability is shared by two persons, the tipper of
the information and his tippee. Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 can be more easily applied to the cor-
porate manager who is a trader on inside information than to the
corporate manager who is just a tipper of inside information, or to his
tippee who transacts in shares based upon that information.
Although insider trading falls more clearly within the language
of ,these anti-fraud provisions, insider tipping is less capable of justi-
fication and is therefore more within the "spirit" of the prohibition of
lOb-5. Corporate managers should be encouraged to own shares in
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their own corporations to insure their loyal participation in the organi-
zation. Although this justification does not mean that we ought not to
be concerned about the disparity of information between shareholder
and manager, it does suggest that there are affirmative reasons for
allowing corporate managers to purchase stock in their own companies.
However, there would appear to be no such justification for insider
tipping. The only argument to support insider tipping, aside from one
based upon the idea that transacting in the stock market is like gambling
and therefore subject to the rules of caveat emptor and caveat venditor,
is that it is a necessary flow of information. A high premium should be
placed on the free flow of information in the market place, but insider
tipping does not beneficially advance that objective and has the negative
impact of creating a substantial disparity of information between the
tippee and other parties not privy to the inside information. Private
disclosures are an unevenhanded flow, reaching some persons and not
others, and reaching many by the unreliable medium of rumor.
To justify either insider trading or tipping, one might point to
transactions in land and argue that the law does not always require a
purchaser to disclose all the information at his disposal. That rule finds
justification in many situations because it encourages people to under-
take the task of uncovering our natural resources, and because it in-
volves information which is more patent than inside information, which
requires contact with a corporate manager.
Also, the courts should place the burden of pecuniary compensa-
tion to the injured investor on the tippee, but the tipper, in particular
the corporate manager who is responsible for the disclosure, should
suffer the criminal penalty.
In the final analysis, the news media must bear the great burden
of disseminating more news to the public. Their role must increase
as private disclosures decrease. This must be done not just for the
help it will provide to the investor, but for the benefit it will bestow
upon the market by making it a more professional enterprise, and for
the reason, as stated by Professor Cary, that: ". . . integrity in the
capital markets is essential for mass capitalism.1123
123. Farmer, Cary, Fleischer & Halleran, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus.
LAW 1009, 1010 (1966).
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